Vincent Rotta JR. v. Hal Hawk : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1986
Vincent Rotta JR. v. Hal Hawk : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Noall T. Wooton; Attorney for Appellant.
Richard A. Rappaport, Keith W. Meade; Cohne, Rappaport & Segal; Attorneys for Repsondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Rotta v. Hawk, No. 860356 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/276
V I 
)CKET NO. <IU>ZSU-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
VINCENT ROTTA, JR., WESTERN 
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO., 
et al. , 
Plaintiffs, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent 
vs 
HAL HAWK, HOME SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Defendants, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant 
Ca^e No. 860356 CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS 
APPELLANT, HOME SAVINGS AJTO LOAN 
Appeal by Western General and J Home Savings 
from Orders of the Third District Court, 
Honorable Timothy Hansen, Granting Summary 
Judgment on Mechanics Liens Claims 
Noall T. Wootton 
8 North Center Street 
P.O, Box 310 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Attorney for Appellant and 
Cross Respondent Western General 
Construction 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT <5c SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt LaWe City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent and 
Cross Appellant Home Savings 
and Loan 
^ JUN 11 1987 U 
8bo35Jb-oK 
COURT OF APPEALS 
COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
VINCENT ROTTA, JR., WESTERN 
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO., 
et al., 
Plaintiffs, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent 
vs 
HAL HAWK, HOME SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Defendants, Respondent 
and Cposs-Appellant 
Case No. 86 0 3 56 CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS 
APPELLANT, HOME SAVINGS AND LOAN 
Appeal by Western General and Home Savings 
from Orders of the Third District Court, 
Honorable Timothy Hansen, Granting Summary 
Judgment on Mechanic's Liens Claims 
Noall T. Wootton 
8 North Center Street 
P.O. Box 310 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Attorney for Appellant and 
Cross Respondent Western General 
Construction 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, I^PPAPORT & SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt LaHe City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent and 
Cross Appellant Home Savings 
and Loan 
LIST OF PARTIES AT THE TRIAL COURT 
This appeal is from four eases which were consolidated in 
the trial court as Vincent Rotta, Jr. v. Hal Hawk, C84-6174. The 
only parties to the appeal are Western general Construction and 
Home Savings and Loan. The parties in the consolidated cases 
were: 
VINCENT ROTTA, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
HAL HAWK, individually and 
DBA KALCO PARTNERSHIP and 
KENT DENNIS, individually and 
DBA KALCO PARTNERSHIP, PIHL 
and CLARK ENTERPRISES, INC. 
a Utah Corporation, EMPIRE 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, HOME SAVINGS 
AND LOAN, a Utah Corporation, 
CONTROL MANAGEMENT, a 
Utah Corporation, EQUITY 
RELIANCE CORPORATION, a Utah 
Corporation, JACK NIXON, an 
individual, COORDINATED 
INVESTMENTS, a Utah General 
Partnership, EDNA RAE MADSEN, 
an individual and John Does 
1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C84-6174 
* * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * 
WESTERN GENERAL CONSTRUCTION 
CO., INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
PIHL AND CLARK ENTERPRISES, 
INC., HOME SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, EQUITY RELIANCE 
CORP., IPC LTD., and 
CONTROLLED MANAGEMENT, 
Defendants. 
Civi1 No. C8 5-5 2 68 
KIRBY BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
WESTERN GENERAL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, PIHL-CLARK 
ENTERPRISES, INC., PIHL-
CLARK ENTERPRISE, INC. 
dba IPC LTD., DENNIS P. 
NIELSEN, EQUITY RELIANCE 
CORPORATION, HORIZON WEST 
ENTERPRISES, DIVERSIFIED 
PLANNING CORPORATION, 
WESTERN SAVINGS AND LOAN 
COMPANY, VINCENT ROTTA, JR., 
LOGAN SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, HOME SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
INTERMOUNTAIN FASTENING 
SYSTEMS, K & M SPECIALTIES 
COMPANY, PIONEER DOOR SALES, 
SMITH'S & WHITE MASONRY, 
KNOWLTON H. BROWN CONSTRUCTION, 
JOHNSON ELECTRIC MOTORS, INC., 
GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS, INC., 
ACME FENCE COMPANY, INC., 
RCI, INC., RAY GILLIES dba 
Civil No. C85-5384 
GILLIES' BACK HOE SERVICE, 
INTERSTATE BRICK COMPANY, 
KALCO PARTNERSHIP, a Utah 
corporation, EQUITIES, INC., 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, 
HARPER EXCAVATING, INC., 
R.C.I., INC., 
vs 
HOME SAVINGS & LOAN, 
PIHL AND CLARK ENTERPRISES 
INC., WESTERN GENERAL 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Def endants. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i i 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 1 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 1 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVIS IONS . . .
 K 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 7 
I. The trust deed of Home Savings has 
priority over the mechanic'sj 1 iens , 
including the lien of Western General 7 
II. Home Savings is entitled to recover 
attorney's fees as the successful party 18 
CONCLUS ION 26 
APPENDIX 
Exhibit A - Map of Project site. 
Exhibit B - Trustee's Deed 
Exhibit C - Project 2 Contract.. 
. I 
vi 
Statutes 
UCA §38-1-5 (1953) 
UCA §38-1-18 (1953). . . 
UCA §38-1-17 (1953). . . 
Rev. Laws §1400 (1898) 
Comp. St. §1400 (1907) 
VI 1 1 
IX 
.X 
Constitutional Provisions 
Article VI, Section 26, Utah Constitution xi 
Cases 
Brubaker v. Bennett, 19 Utah 401, 57 Pac. 170 
(Utah 1899) xi i 
Rupp v. Earl H. Cline & Sons, 188 A.2d 146, 1 A.L.R. 
3d 815 (Md. 1963) xiv 
Western Mortgage Loan Co. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 
18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967) xix 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Aladdin Heating Corp. v. Trustees of Central States, 
564 P.2d 82 (Nevada 1977) 14,18 
Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah 2d 364, 294 P.2d 703 (1956) 10 
Brand v. First Federal Savings & Loan of Fairbanks, 
478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970)... 21 
Brubaker v. Bennett, 19 Utah 401, 57 Pac. 170 (1899). . . 23,24,25 
Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 13, 14, 16 
Clark v. General Electric Co., 243 Ark. 399, 420 S.W. 2d 830 
(1967) 15 
Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Gepada, Inc., 
401 F.Supp. 682 (D.C. la. 1975) 15 
First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521 
(Utah 1979) 12 
First National Bank of Ardmore v. Worthly, 714 P.2d 1044 
(Ok la. 1985) 21 
Irwin Concrete, Inc. v. Sun Coast Properties, 653 P.2d 1331 
(Wash. 1982) . . 2 0 
Maule Industries v. Gaines Construction, 157 So.2d 835 
(Fla. 1963) 16 
Mysawka v. Mullen, 73 Montgomery County Law Rptr. 497 
(Montg. Co. Pa. 1957) 16, 17 
Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 
(1969) 19 
Perkins Const. Co. v. Ten-Fifteen Corp., 545 S.W. 2d 494 
(Tex. 1979) 16 
Rupp v. Earl H. Cline & Sons, Inc., 188 A.2d 146, 
1 A.L.R. 3d 815 (Md. 1963)... 10,11,16 
Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246 
(Utah 1966) 2 0 
Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 
341 P.2d 207 (1957) 17 
Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. Guar. Assn., 
564 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977) 2 5 
Western Mortgage Loan Co. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 
18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967) 8,9,11,14,18 
- i i -
Other Authorities 
Anno., "What Constitutes Commencement of Building or 
Improvement for Purposes of Determining Accrual of 
Mechanics Liens," 1 A.L.R. 3d 82k 16 
16 Am. Jur. 2d, Const. Law §137 24 
57 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Mechanic T s Liens §179 9,15 
Jones on Liens, Section 1469, 14^74 9 
Cons titutional Provisions 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution 1 
Article VI, Section 26 of the Ut^h 
Cons titution 2,6,24 
Statutes 
Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution 25 
U.C.A. §3 8-1-5 1,2,7, 19 
U.C.A. §38-1-17 20,23 
U.C.A. §3 8-1-18 1,2,6,18 
U.C.A. §78-2-2(3) (i) 1 
Rev. St. §1400 (1898) 23,24 
Rev. St. §1394 (1898) 23 
Compiled Laws §1400 (1907) 24 
- i i i 
This brief is the reply of Home Savings and Loan to that of 
Western General Construction regarding the issue of priority of 
mechanics lien claims. The brief is also filed in support of 
the cross-appeal of Home Savings on the issue of attorney1s fees. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This case was poured over into the Court of Appeals by the 
Utah Supreme Court. Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court was vested 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution and 
U.C.A. S 78-2-2(3) (i ). 
The issues on appeal were decided by the Third District 
Court pursuant to summary judgment and subsequent certification 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Does the trust deed interest of Home Savings and Loan 
have priority, as that term is used in U.C.A. § 38-1-5, over the 
mechanicTs lien claim of Western General Construction? 
2. Is Home Savings and Loan entitled to recover attorneyTs 
fees pursuant to U.C.A. §38-1-18 as a successful party in the 
mechanics lien foreclosure action? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Interpretation of the following statutes is at issue: 
U.C.A. § 38-1-5 
38-1-5. Priority - Over other encumbrances. 
"The liens herein provided for shall relate 
back to, and take effect as of, the time of the 
commencement to do work or furnish materials on 
the ground for the structure or improvement, and 
shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or 
other encumbrance which may have attached 
subsequently to the time when the building, 
improvement, or structure was commenced, work 
begun or first material furnished on the ground; 
also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance 
of which the lien holder had no notice and which 
was unrecorded at the time the building, 
structure or improvement was commenced, work 
begun, or first material furnished on the 
ground." 
U.C.A. § 38-1-18 
38-1-18. Attorneyfs fees. 
"In any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee, 
to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as 
costs in the action." 
In addition, consideration of the effect of the following 
constitutional provision on U.C.A. §38-1-18 is presented: 
Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 26: 
No private or special law shall be enacted 
where a general law can be applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Third Judicial District court, (Honorable Timothy 
Hansen) ruled in a memorandum decision (R.307) that: 
"Based upon the facts and circumstances before 
the court as undisputed facts regarding the 
question of "commencement to work" as that 
term is used in § 38-1-5 of Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended, it does not appear 
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to the Court, under the appropriate case law 
that governs the issue, that thfere has been a 
commencement to do work as to place the lien 
claimant ahead of the mortgage." (R.308). 
Pursuant to a Partial Summary Judgment (fe. 380), the Court ruled 
that the interest of Home Savings and Loan was prior to and 
superior to the mechanic's liens, including the lien of Western 
General Construction. 
Subsequently, the trial Court denied Home Savings' Motion 
for Attorney's Fees (R.625, 626) and certified that its orders 
regarding priority and attorney's fees were final orders pursuant 
to Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. (R.628). Both decisions are on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACT$ 
This action involves two projects for the construction of 
self-storage units in Sandy, Utah. The projects were designed to 
and proceeded under separate contracts. (R. 225). Home Savings 
was the construction lender on each projtect, Western General was 
the general contractor. There were separate loans and separate 
construction contracts entered into with respect to each 
project. (R. 225, 226) 
The first project (referred to iri the documents of the 
parties as Phases I and II) was bu^lt upon three parcels 
designated as Parcels 1, 2 and 3 on the map filed with the trial 
Court, R. 218. (A copy of the map is attached to this brief as 
Exhibit "A".) It was conceded in the tibial court (R. 665) that 
there was no issue regarding Home Savings' priority for Project 1 
on Parcels 1, 2 and 3. 
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The second project was built upon parcels designated as 
parcels A and B, located immediately south of the first 
project. (R. 225) Parcels A and B were the subject of a 
separate loan (trust deed of Home Savings recorded June 7, 1984, 
R.219) and a separate construction contract (Exhibit C in 
Appendix, dated June 20, 1984, R. 241, R. 225) between the owner 
and Western General Construction. 
Western General's appeal is directed only to the issue of 
priority on Project 2. It was agreed at the oral argument in the 
trial court that there were no fact issues, the only issue being 
one of law. (R. 687, 688) 
The following undisputed facts support the trial court's 
determination regarding the priority of Home Savings as to 
Project 2, i.e. Parcels A and B: 
1. The trust deed of Home Savings and Loan (the 
construction lender) as to Project 2 (Parcels A and B) was 
recorded on June 7, 1984. (R. 231). 
2. The contract of Western General Construction (the 
general contractor) to construct Project 2 (Phase III) was 
submitted to the owner on June 20, 1984, some two weeks after 
Home Savings1 trust deed was recorded (R. 241). 
3. Prior to June 20, 1984 no work had commenced toward to 
the construction of improvements for Project 2 which was visible 
on Parcels A and B, except for some general clearing of plant 
material and the movement of top soil related to Project 1. (R. 
226). 
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4. This movement of top soil and clearing of plant material 
was apparently done in April and May, 1984. Any top soil that 
was moved from the Project 2 parcels (Parcels A and B) was moved 
to the Project 1 parcels (Parcels 1, 2 and 3). (R. 259, 286). 
There was no evidence that the movement of the topsoil from 
Parcels A and B to Parcels 1, 2 and 3 was in any way related to 
the improvements which were ultimately constructed on Parcels A 
and B for Project 2. (R. 683, L. 15-20) (R. 286, para. 5). 
5. As of June 7, 1984, the date Home Savings' trust deed 
was recorded, parcels A and B still had residences on them that 
were being rented out. The residences remained rented until the 
end of June, 1984, when the residences were demolished. (R. 
286). 
6. After the rental units on A and B were demolished, 
Western General brought in fill to parcels A and B and graded 
them to achieve proper elevations for the improvements on Project 
2 (Parcels A and B ) . (R. 286, 287). 
7. There was no evidence that there was any equipment 
located on or working on Parcels A and B in June, 1984, or more 
particularly, on June 7, 1984, when Home Savings trust deed was 
recorded. The only evidence of record was that the clearing and 
movement of soil which was done was done in April and May, 
1984. (R. 259) 
8. There is no evidence in the record which suggests that 
any work had commenced on the structures to be built on Parcels A 
and B prior to June 7, 1984, nor any evidence to suggest that any 
movement of earth on Parcels A and B in April or May in any way 
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benefited or facilitated the structures which were later built on 
A and B as part of Project 2. 
9. Preliminary field surveys were not commenced for Project 
2 (Parcels A and B) until June 25, 1984. (R. 223) 
Subsequent to the entry of the judgment determining the 
priority of Home Savings1 trust deed over the mechanic's lien, 
Home Savings moved for a judgment of attorney's fees pursuant to 
U.C.A. §38-1-18. The trial court denied this motion. The 
following facts are relevant to the cross-appeal regarding 
attorney's fees: 
1. Six lien claimants sought to foreclose their mechanic's 
liens as against Home Savings & Loan, including Western General 
Construction. ( R. 435). 
2. At one time, there were three separate actions by 
claimants which required an active defense by Home Savings. (R. 
436). 
3. Counsel for Home Savings reviewed and analyzed thousands 
of pages of invoices and receipts, conducted numerous interviews, 
engaged in research and prepared numerous pleadings. The total 
cost of successfully defending Home Savings against the lien 
foreclosure actions was $11,902.50. (R. 435). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court properly determined that "the time of 
the commencement to do work . . . on the ground (Parcels A and B) 
for the structure or improvement" occurred after Home Savings' 
trust deed was recorded, and the trust deed of Home Savings was 
prior to and superior to the mechanic's liens. 
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2. The trial court's denial of Home Savings1 motion for 
attorneyTs fees incurred in its successful defense against the 
lien claims is contrary to U.C.A. § 3B-1-18 and Article VI, 
Section 26 of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRUST DEED OF HOME SAVINGS HAS PRIORITY 
OVER THE MECHANIC'S LIENS, INCLUDING THE 
LIEN OF WESTERN GENERAL. 
The ruling of the trial court establishing the priority of 
Home Savings' trust deed disposed of many mechanic's liens 
claims. Only Western General Construction, the general 
contractor who filed a "blanket" lien, ha$ appealed. 
The issue presented by Western General's appeal is whether 
the clearing of trees and movement of topsoil on Parcels A and B 
prior to June 7, 1984, the date Home Savings' trust deed was 
recorded, creates "priority" for its mechanic's lien as that term 
is used in U.C.A. § 38-1-5. As set forth herein, priority was 
not established by Western General or any lien claimants. 
Initially, it must be observed th&t each of the parties 
agreed at argument of the motion for summary judgment that there 
were no issues of fact. (R. 687, 688). 
None of the mechanic's liens against Parcels A and B were 
recorded prior to June 7, 1984, when Home Savings trust deed was 
recorded. Therefore, the lien claimants must rely on U.C.A. § 
38-1-5 to establish priority. 
When summarized the undisputed facts are that some trees 
were cleared and some top soil was moved from Parcels A and B 
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(Project 2) to the adjacent Parcels 1, 2, and 3 (Project 1) prior 
to June 7, 1984. This movement of top soil was for the benefit 
of Parcels 1, 2 and 3 and was not done in furtherance of the 
contract for Project 2 which was entered into between the owner 
and the contractor on June 20, 1984. (R. 259, 286). In fact, 
additional fill was brought back into Parcels A and B to bring 
them up to grade during construction on Parcels A and B (Project 
2). (R. 287). Field surveys of Parcels A and B were not 
commenced until June 25, 1984 (R. 223). Rental homes remained on 
Parcels A and B until the end of June. There was no evidence 
that there was any machinery on or work actually proceeding on 
Parcels A and B on June 7, 1984 or any day prior thereto in June, 
1984. 
As set forth hereinafter, these facts do not support a 
finding of priority for the lien claimants. 
The foregoing facts reflect that none of the work that was 
done on Parcels A and B (Project 2) prior to June 7 was related 
to the subsequent improvements constructed on Parcels A and B. 
The work was clearly not excavation for the Project 2 units. 
Even if the work had been related to the improvements ultimately 
constructed on Project 2, the work was insufficient to create 
pr i or i ty. 
There are two requirements set forth in U.C.A. §38-1-5 and 
in the cases decided under it that Western General must prove to 
establish priority for Project 2: first, that work alleged to 
constitute commencement of work on the structure or improvement 
has been performed; and second, that the work be clearly 
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recognizable as the beginning of the improvement. Wes tern 
Mortgage Loan Co. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 
P.2d 437 (1967). 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently observed that the 
"problem is one of notice. The presence of materials on the 
building site or evidence on the ground that work was commenced 
on a structure or preparatory thereto is notice to all the world 
that liens may have attached." Western Mortgage, supra, p. 
439. 
The issue of the type of work necessary to create notice 
under the lien statute has been the subject of frequent 
consideration. The general rule as to what constitutes 
commencement of work on a building is contained in 57 Corpus 
Juris Secundum, Mechanics Liens, §179: 
"The commencement of the building or improvement 
within the meaning of mechanics liens statutes 
is the visible commencement of ^ctual operations 
on the ground for the erection of the building, 
the doing of some work or labor on the ground, 
such as beginning to excavate for the foundation 
or the basement or cellar, walling the cellar, or 
work of a like description, which every one can 
readily see and recognize as th^ commencement of 
a building, and which is done with the intention 
and purpose then formed to continue the work 
until the completion of the building. 
On the other hand, work which, although it may 
improve the property, is merely preparatory to 
building operations at some future time, and does 
not of itself tend to contribute directly to the 
erection, such as clearing, leveling, filling up, 
or fencing the property . . . does not constitute 
a commencement for the purpose of fixing a time 
to which the lien relates, especially when done 
without any present intention ot building. Also 
staking out the plan of the building or the line 
of foundation, or staking the boundary line of 
the tract, . . . does no 
commencement of the building wi 
of the lien statutes." (Emphasis added.) 
t cons ti tute a 
thin the meaning 
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See also: Jones on Liens, Section 1469, 1474. 
In Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah 2d 364, 294 P.2d 703 (1956), an 
action involving a bond claim, the Utah court analyzed mechanics 
liens cases interpreting language similar to that of U.C.A. § 38-
1-5 and stated: 
"let it be conceded that leveling land enhances 
its value and improves its utility. It does not 
follow that such leveling constitutes an 
improvement upon land. It would seem to be an 
unreasonable construction to hold that a contract 
for plowing, seeding or manuring of land is a 
contract for the construction of an improvement 
upon land." Id., at 705. 
The case of Rupp v. Earl H. Cline & Sons, Inc., 188 A.2d 
146, 1 A.L.R. 3d 815 (Md. 1963) (case included in appendix) is 
very analogous to the case at issue. In Rupp, the developer 
purchased a 50 acre tract of property for the development of 
cottages and apartments. The cottages were to be constructed 
first, with the apartments to follow on another part of the 50 
acres. During the construction of the cottages, the contractor 
needed additional fill and borrowed it from another portion of 
the 50 acre site where the apartments were to be built later. 
The contractor removed some 2,000 cubic yards of soil, from the 
apartment parcel, excavating to a depth of four to six feet in 
some places, thereby leveling the site to the approximate grade 
needed for the apartments. Some six months after work began on 
the cottages, a second contract was issued for the construction 
of apartments and a deed of trust on the apartment property was 
recorded securing the second construction loan. When the slabs 
for the apartments were laid, little additional excavation work 
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was necessary because of the prior excavation. The court 
addressed the priority issue and after considerable discussion 
concluded that: 
"While the removal of soil had the effect of 
leveling the apartment site, that fact did not 
constitute commencement for the purposes of 
fixing the time to which a 1 i en could relate. 
[ci tat ion omi tted] Nor did 
leveling, since there was no work on the ground 
the grading or 
and recognize as 
ding, [citation 
utting the party 
which everyone could readily see 
the commencement of a buil< 
omitted] - have the effect of pi 
making the construction loan on notice that the 
building had been commenced, and we so hold." 
The Rupp court went on to state: 
"But even if it is assumed (tot the purpose of 
this case) that there was no substantial change 
of plan and that the owner and builder had a 
continuing intention - if and when they could get 
financing and permission - to erect apartments of 
some type, we think it is apparent that the 
removal of soil from one part of a development to 
another even for the dual purpose of grading one 
site to a specified level and filling in the 
other to the required height was at most a 
preparatory operation that was not the 
"commencement of a building." 
The Utah Supreme Court cited favoitably the Rupp case in 
reaching its decision in Western Mortgagft, supra, 424 P.2d 437, 
that not all work creates notice under § 38-1-5. In Wes tern 
Mortgage, the lender made a loan for the construction of a 
residence on a lot in a subdivision. The evidence was that "the 
work of laying out and developing the subdivision, including 
engineering, installing water mains, sewer mains and laterals, 
curb and gutter, surfacing streets and other off-site 
construction" was done before the mortgage was recorded. The 
lien claimants argued that this work was sufficient to establish 
priority as to the lot. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed: 
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"We are not inclined to give the statute such a 
broad meaning as contended for by the 
appellants. We are inclined to the view that the 
legislature intended the language "commencement 
to do work or furnish materials on the ground" to 
be limited to relate to the home or other 
structure which was being built upon the land." 
In spite of Western GeneralTs apparent contention at page 5 
of its Memorandum that clearly visible excavation and site 
preparation had commenced, there are no facts in the case before 
this Court to suggest that the removal of soil from Parcels A and 
B had any relation to the improvements ultimately constructed on 
Parcels A and B. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary - fill 
had to be hauled back onto Parcels A and B to achieve proper 
elevations before the slabs could be laid for Project 2. (R. 
287, para. 6) With the possible exception of tree removal, the 
work done on Parcels A and B prior to June 7, 1984, actually led 
to more work on those parcels before the improvements could 
begin. 
Two subsequent Utah Supreme Court decisions have addressed 
the issue of priority. In First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. 
Zundel, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), the issue of priority involved 
a construction loan "for the financing of improvements on the 44-
acre property, which was to comprise 54 single-family building 
sites and 69 condominium units." (p. 523) The improvements 
which had commenced prior to the recording of the lenderTs trust 
deed apparently included the installation of sewer and water on 
the entire site. The Court found that this type of work enhanced 
the value of the developer's land and was necessary to make the 
residences habitable. (p. 525) The Court then distinguished the 
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Western Mortgage case based upon the purpose of the loans, the 
loan in Zundel having been specifically made for "off-site 
improvements." The Court clearly left intact the requirement 
that the work provide notice of the conmencement of the actual 
improvements to be constructed. 
In this case, the work of clearing trees and moving top soil 
on the Project 2 parcels prior to June 7 did not benefit the 
Project 2 property. It also gave no notice that a building was 
going to be constructed on the Project 2 parcels. 
The second decision to address priority was Calder Bros. Co. 
v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). In Calder Bros., the new 
owner of the Star Palace hired some work done on the building 
before the mortgage was recorded. "The work performed prior to 
the recording of Calder Bros.1 mortgage included painting the 
building exterior, cutting down two trees, clearing weeds and 
placing grout in the building. At no point up to and including 
the time Calder Bros.T mortgage was recorded, was it evident from 
the inspection of the premises that aiji improvement had been 
commenced." (p. 924). The Supreme Court observed that: 
The purpose of the mechanic's lien act is 
remedial in nature and seeks to provide 
protection to laborers and materialmen who 
have added directly to the value of the 
property of another by their materials or 
labor." (p. 924) 
As is the situation in the present case, there was no question in 
Calder Bros, that some work had been performed on the property 
prior to the recording of the mortgage. Applying the standard 
just quoted above, the Supreme Court concluded that priority had 
not been established. This conclusion was reached on two 
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basis: first, that there was no evidence on the site that an 
improvement had been commenced; (p. 924) and second, the 
improvements ultimately made negated the value of the prior 
work, (p. 925), The touchstone for both of these factors is 
whether value was directly added to the property by the materials 
or labor. 
By applying the Calder Bros, criteria to the present case, 
it becomes more apparent that priority was not established by the 
clearing of trees or the borrowing of top soil. Neither of these 
tasks "added directly to the value of the property." In fact, 
soil had to be hauled back onto Project 2 for construction. 
The vast majority of cases from other states support the 
conclusion of the Calder Bros, case. In Aladdin Heating Corp. v. 
Trustees of Central States, 563 P.2d 82 (Nevada 1977) the Court 
was petitioned to determine whether architectural soil testing 
and survey work constituted commencement of work. The pertinent 
statutory provision allowed any lien to attach "subsequent to the 
time when the building, improvement or structure was commenced, 
or materials were commenced to be furnished." N.R.S. 108.225. 
The Nevada Supreme Court relied on the visibility requirement in 
Western Mortgage, supra, and found that the facts relied on for 
priority were insufficient to constitute commencement of work. 
The Court stated: 
"Were we to hold otherwise, and permit mechanics 
liens to accrue based on this work done prior to 
the commencement of construction, mechanic1s 
liens could relate back to a time long before 
there were any visible signs of construction to 
inform prospective lenders inspecting the 
premises that liens had attached. Under such 
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circumstances, no prudent business man would be 
willing to lend money." _Id_ at 84L 
The issue of whether clearing the land of brush, debris and 
trees constitutes commencement of work in order to establish 
priority of a mechanic's lien was also resolved by the Arkansas 
Supreme Court in Clark v. General Electri0 Co., 243 Ark. 399, 420 
S.W. 2d 830 (1967). The court interpreted commencement to mean 
"some visible or manifest action on the premises to be improved, 
making it apparent that the building is going up, or other 
improvement is to be made", j_d., at 833. The Court followed the 
visibility requirement established by a majority of states, which 
hold that "mere preparation of the land for the construction is 
not sufficient." On this rationale, the Court held that priority 
was not established. 
Resolution of the same issue under a similar factual 
situation was considered in Diversified Mortgage Investors v. 
Gepada, Inc., 401 F.Supp. 682 (D.C. la 1975), where a mechanic's 
lien claimant sought priority over a recorded mortgage by 
attempting to establish commencement Of work based on the 
following acts: (1) having a farmer mow the weeds off the soil 
of the lot, (2) spending four hours determining the existing 
ground elevations, and (3) removing six inches of top soil, weeds 
and vegetation. The Court in Divers i f ied stated that Iowa 
follows those states adhering to the ruie quoted in 57 C.J.S., 
Mechanic's Lien, § 179(b) supra, which states that commencement 
means the "visible commencement of actual operations." In 
Divers i f ied, as in the instant case, the acts purported to 
constitute commencement of work were performed prior to a signing 
of the contract to construct the building on the lot. 
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Numerous other cases reach a similar conclusion, i.e., that 
preliminary site preparation is not commencement of work 
sufficient to create notice to a lender that liens have 
attached. Maule Industries v. Gaines Construction, 157 S.2d 835 
(Fla. 1963) (removing grass and scarifying a portion of the 
land); Perkins Const. Co. v. Ten-Fifteen Corp., 545 S.W. 2d 494 
(Tex. 1979) (clearing). 
The author of the annotation entitled "What Constitutes 
Commencement of Building or Improvement for Purposes of 
Determining Accrual of Mechanics Lien", 1 A.L.R. 3d 822 states 
at page 824 that: 
It has been generally recognized that in order 
for the work done on the premises to constitute 
the commencement of a building under mechanics 
lien statutes which state in effect that a 
mechanics lien accrues to the lien claimants at 
the time the building is commenced, it is 
necessary that it become obvious from the work 
done on the premises that a building is going up, 
and the owner must have intended to construct a 
building at the time the initial work on the 
premises was begun. 4 
[4. This very broad proposition is supported, at 
least impliedly, by the great majority of cases 
found throughout the annotation.] 
The author goes on in § 5 and discusses numerous cases, 
including Rupp v. Cline, supra, where clearing, grading or filing 
had been commenced, each of which support the proposition that 
clearing, grading and filling are not sufficient to constitute 
commencement of work for priority to attach. The final case in 
the section, which is set forth as an exception to the majority 
rule, is the case of Mysawka v. Mullen, 73 Montgomery County Law 
Rptr. 497 (Montg. Co. Pa 1957), relied upon by Western General. 
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The Mysawka case is a county court decision whose only citation 
is in the ALR annotation. The fact that the Mysawka opinion has 
been in the annotation since 1965 when tjhe volume was published 
and never been subsequently cited itself reflects upon the value 
of the case as precedent. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly 
rejected in Calder Bros., supra, the conclusion in Mysawka that 
the felling of trees creates priority. Any Pennsylvania 
mechanic's lien statute upon which the ca£e may have been decided 
has been repealed (Pa. Code 49 § 1501, et. seq.) and there is no 
reason to believe that the case reflects current Pennsylvania 
law. Perhaps more significant about the Mysawka case is that it 
does not deal at all with the issue of priority as that term 
relates to mechanic's liens. In Mysawka, the issue was whether 
an agreement, allowed by statute, between the owner and general 
contractor precluding liens was binc|ing on the claimant 
subcontractor so as to avoid his lien against the owner. No 
lender was involved in Mysawka. As against an owner of property, 
priority is not an issue. Priority is an issue only against 
claimants other than the owner. 
Western General argues that the lien statute should be 
broadly construed in favor of lien claimants. Mechanic's liens 
are purely creatures of statute and are in derogation of general 
rules requiring interests in property to be recorded to 
constitute notice to third parties. It is also true that 
statutes should not be construed so as to defeat their intent. 
Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 
(1957). The intent of the Utah mechanic's lien statute as 
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expressed in Western Mortgage, supra, is to protect lien 
claimants where the work is such that there is notice on the 
property itself that work has commenced on the structure or 
improvement. There are also considerable rights of lenders at 
stake. In Aladdin Heating v. Trustees of Cent. States, 564 P.2d 
at 84 (Nev. 1977), the Nevada court specifically recognized that 
if mechanic's liens could relate back to a time before there were 
visible signs of construction, "no prudent businessman would be 
willing to lend construction money." 
The trust deed of Home Savings and Loan is prior to the 
interest of the mechanics lien claimants. 
II 
HOME SAVINGS AND LOAN IS ENTITLED TO 
RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES AS THE 
"SUCCESSFUL PARTY." 
U.C.A. § 38-1-18 provides in full that: 
In any action brought to enforce any lien under 
this Chapter, the successful party shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee, 
to be fixed by the Court which shall be taxed as 
costs in the action. 
Home Savings was joined as a party defendant in each of the 
mechanic's liens actions and was ultimately a party defendant to 
six claims or crossclaims. Each of the six claimants sought to 
foreclose their mechanic's lien and thereby foreclose as against 
the trust deeds of Home Savings. Home Savings was required to 
retain counsel to defend its interests in the property or be 
foreclosed on a loan in excess of one million dollars. Home 
Savings was successful on each of the claims in the trial court. 
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After the trial court's ruling pn the mechanic's lien 
claims, Home Savings moved for an award of attorney's fees only 
against the parties who had sought to foreclose Home Savings' 
interest. The issue was argued to Judge Hansen on November 3, 
1986, (R. 700-729), and in an oral ruling (R. 721-725) the trial 
court declined to award attorney's fees* (The Judge commented 
during the hearing that he felt he might get reversed on appeal 
on the issue of attorney's fees. R. 728, 1. 2-5). 
It is clear from § 38-1-5 that the issue of priority is an 
integral part of any successful mechanic's lien foreclosure 
action. U.C.A. §38-1-5 specifically refers to priority as 
affecting not only lienholders but mortgages. Thus, the 
mechanic's lien claimant has two choices when he initiates his 
action: 1) he can join the owner and other lien claimants, or 2) 
seek foreclosure against everyone, including construction and 
mortgage lenders. If he elects the first course and is 
successful, he takes the property subject to the mortgage. In 
this case, the six claimants each attempted to establish priority 
over Home Savings' trust deed interest. As against Home Savings, 
they were clearly not successful. 
It is clear in Utah that as between the owner and lien 
claimant, the successful party is to be awarded its attorney's 
fees. Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 
(1969). The only new issue before this court is whether a 
mortgage lender can be included within the meaning of "successful 
party" as that term is used in § 38-1-18. 
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The argument will be made by Western General that § 38-1-18, 
when read in conjunction with § 38-1-17 (which provides in part 
that "as between the owner and the contractor, the Court shall 
apportion costs according to the right of the case . . T!) and 
Shupe v, Menlove, 417 P.2d 246 (which states generally that 38-1-
17 and 38-1-18 are to be read together " . . . and that when 
attorney's fees are awardable thereunder, they are to be treated 
as costs . . . " ) , precludes an award of attorney's fees to a 
lender. The argument ignores the broad language of §38-1-18. 
There are no Utah cases which deny attorney's fees to a 
successful lender under § 38-1-18. Counsel is not aware of any 
case from any other jurisdiction with a statute similar to Utah's 
which denies attorney's fees to a lender who is successful in 
establishing priority in defense of a mechanic's liens 
foreclosure action. 
The State of Washington has a mechanic's lien statute which 
includes in RCW 60.04.130 the following language: 
". . . The Court may allow to the prevailing 
party in the action, whether plaintiff or 
defendant, as part of the cost of the action, 
the monies paid for filing or recording the 
claim, and a reasonable attorney's fee in the 
Superior Court, Court of Appeals, and Supreme 
Court." 
In the Washington case of Irwin Concrete, Inc. v. Sun Coast 
Proper ti es, 653 P.2d 1331 (1982), the mechanic's lien claimants 
sought relief against the lenders and the owner on their 
mechanic's liens. The trial court determined, apparently 
pursuant to summary judgment, that the trust deed of the lender 
had priority with respect to the mechanic's liens which had been 
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filed. The Washington Court specifically ruled, at page 1338, 
that the lenders were entitled to recovfer their attorney's fees 
as the prevailing party in the lien foreclosure action based upon 
the statute. In addition, the lenders were awarded their 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
At least two other states have implicitly determined under 
their mechanic's lien statutes that & successful lender is 
entitled to recover attorney's fees upoji establishing priority. 
In the Oklahoma case of First National Bank of Ardmore v. 
Worthly, 714 P.2d 1044 (1985), a bank sued to foreclose its trust 
deed and was confronted with a counterclaim for a mechanic's lien 
determination, including the issue of priority. The trial court 
found co-equal priority and refused to allocate attorney's 
fees. Implicit in this decision is the notion that the fees 
would have been awarded if the priority issue had been determined 
in favor of the lender. The Oklahoma statute, OSA 42 §176 
states: "In an action brought to enforce any lien, the party for 
whom judgment is rendered shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the Court, which shall 
be taxed as costs in the action." In the Alaska case of Brand v. 
First Federal Savings & Loan of Fairbanks, 478 P.2d 829 (1970), a 
mechanic's lien claimant sued the leader to foreclose its 
mechanic's lien. Although the Court did hot specifically address 
the issue of attorney's fees, it was implicit in the Court's 
decision that the lender was entitled to recover its fees. 
There is no rational basis why, in a case wherein a 
mechanic's lien claimant seeks affirmative relief against a 
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lender, that the lender should not be entitled to recover its 
attorney's fees pursuant to U.C.A. §38-1-8 if it is successful in 
the defense of its trust deed. The lender's participation is not 
voluntary, it is a matter of survival as against a claim 
initiated by the mechanic's lien claimant. If the mechanic's 
lien claimant seeks relief only as against the owner, and the 
lender thrusts himself upon the scene, a rational basis may exist 
to deny the lender attorney's fees. Home Savings was not a 
voluntary party to these actions. In the case now before the 
Court, the mechanic's lien claimants failed to prove a crucial 
element of their action, their priority, and as between the 
lender and the lien claimant, the lender was clearly the 
"successful party," entitled to attorney fees. 
There is nothing in U.C.A. §38-1-18 to indicate that it is 
intended to be limited in its scope. The reference to 
"successful party" is as broad as it can be. The unintended 
dilemma the trial court's decision creates for the mortgage 
lender is further evidenced by the fact that if a lien claimant 
prevails as against the lender, the lender has to pay the 
claimant's fees to save the trust deed. 
Therein lies a second, and perhaps more significant, basis 
for reversing the trial court's order denying Home Savings its 
attorney's fees. The decision renders U.C.A. §38-1-18 
uncons titutional. 
Mechanic's lien statutes were created to give a remedy where 
none existed, i.e., to create an interest in real property where 
no recorded transfer has occurred. As enacted in Utah, the 
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statute affects not only the rights of property owners and lien 
claimants, but of mortgage lenders. (U.Q.A. §38-1-5). 
When the Utah mechanic's lien statute was first enacted, it 
included the following provision: 
"In any action brought to enf 
under this chapter, where judgmel 
orce any lien 
nt is rendered 
for a lienholder, such lienhojlder shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's 
fee, not to exceed twenty-five dollars, to be 
fixed by the court, which shall: 
costs in the action." 
1 be taxed as 
(emphasis added). Rev. St. §1400 (1898). Rev. St. §1394 (1898), 
similar to U.C.A. §38-1-17 (1953), provided for apportionment of 
costs between owners and contractors. 
In 1899, the Utah Supreme Court was confronted with the 
claim that Rev. St. §1400 (1898), by limiting attorney's fees to 
a successful lienholder, was unconstitutional. Brubaker v. 
Bennett, 19 Utah 401, 57 Pac. 170 (1899). (Case included in 
Appendix.) In Brubaker, the plaintiff subcontractor was 
successful upon his claim and asked for attorney's fees pursuant 
to Rev. St. §1400 (1898). The defendant owner objected on the 
basis that §1400 was unconstitutional. The trial court and 
Supreme Court agreed: 
"It is a fundamental principle of our 
government that all persons ar^ entitled to 
equal rights and equal protection under the 
law, and that no law shall be 
discriminates against one pai 
benefit of another. All laws, 
nature of the case will permil 
uniform in their operation. This principle is 
expressed in the state constitution in this 
language: "In all cases where a general law 
can be applicable, no special law shall be 
enacted." Const, art. 6, §26, subd. 18. In 
the matter of attorney's fees, or costs in 
suits, a general law can be made applicable to 
enacted which 
|rty for the 
so far as the 
t, should be 
-23-
all parties to the litigation; but section 
1400 of the Revised Statutes is not general, 
but confers the privilege upon a certain class 
of litigants of recovering as costs from the 
opposing party attorney's fees -- a privilege 
which none but the favored class of litigants 
can enjoy under the present laws of the 
state. Such a discrimination in favor of this 
class of litigants is violative of fundamental 
principles and the provisions of the state 
cons ti tut i on. 
The legislature subsequently revised §1400 to refer to "the 
successful party." Compiled Laws §1400 (1907). The legislative 
reaction was an obvious effort to remedy the constitutional 
defect. 
The decision of the trial court denying Home Savings its 
attorney's fees places the constitutional defect back into the 
statute. Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitution 
provides that: 
No private or special law shall be enacted 
where a general law can be applicable. 
To paraphrase Brubaker, a general law can be made applicable to 
all parties to the litigation. Home Savings was clearly made a 
party to the mechanic's lien litigation in an effort by the lien 
claimants, including Western General, to establish priority 
pursuant to U.C.A. §38-1-5. If Home Savings is precluded by §38-
1-18 from recovering its attorney's fees, then §38-1-18 confers a 
privilege upon a certain class of litigants, lien claimants, of 
recovering attorney's fees as costs from the opposing party -- a 
privilege which a lender would not enjoy. 
There is a strong presumption when interpreting statutes to 
give them a construction which renders them constitutionally 
sound. 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Const. Law §137, et seq., Utah Farm 
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Bureau Ins, Co* v. Utah Ins, Guar, Assn. , 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 
1977). U.C.A. §38-1-18 can be construed to be constitutionally 
sound simply by including in the term "successful party" any 
party, including a mortgage lender, which finds itself in the 
class of parties affected by mechanics liens claims. (See Utah 
Farm Bureau Insur., supra at headnote 4, page 754.) 
The unconstitutionality of any construction which precludes 
lenders from being awarded fees is further demonstrated in every 
case where a lien claimant is determined to have priority and is 
awarded attorney's fees, which the lender then has to pay to 
preserve its mortgage. This situation is clearly violative of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
regarding equal protection of laws. (See Brubaker, supra p. 
171) (Both constitutional defects were presented to the trial 
court in oral argument, R. 708 and 709.) 
In this particular case, a third reason exists to support an 
award of attorney's fees. At the time the trial court made its 
ruling with respect to priority, Home Savings was actually the 
owner of Parcels A and B, the same having been previously 
foreclosed and purchased by Home Savings. (Trustee's deed is 
attached as Exhibit B in Appendix.) (R* 713, 714). As such, 
they were an "owner" of Parcels A and B, entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees under any interpretation of U.C.A. §38-1-18. 
For each of the foregoing reasons, Home Savings is entitled 
to an award of attorney's fees, including fees incurred in this 
appeal to be shown in the district court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's determination that Home Savings' trust deed has 
priority over the lien claim of Western General. This Court 
should reverse the trial court's denial of attorney's fees and 
remand for entry of fees incurred in the trial court, on the 
prior appeal, and on this appeal. 
DATED this I day of June, L987. 
•J UM\J). 
Keith W. Meade ^ 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
and Cross Appellant 
Home Savings and Loan 
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The undersigned hereby certifies that four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND 
CROSS APPELLANT, HOME SAVINGS AND LOAN were mailed, 
postage fully prepaid, on the ( day of June, 1987 to 
the following: 
Noall T. Wootton, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant and Cross Respondent 
Western General Construction 
8 North Center Street 
P.O. Box 310 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
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TRUSTEE'6 PEEP 
This Deed, made by and executed by Home Savings and Loan, 
a Utah corporation, and in such capacity as Trustee (hereinafter 
called "Trustee"), under the hereinafter mentioned Deed of Trust, 
and Homo Savings and Loan (herein called "Grantee"); 
W X T N B 8 S B T H S 
WHEREAS, Pihl and Clark Enterprises, Inc., a Utah 
Corporation, by Trust Deed dated May 31, 1984, and recorded June 
7, 1984, as Entry No. 3951698 in Book 5562, at Page 1970 and 
re-recorded on June 27, 1984, as Entry No. 3960410, in Book, 
5568, at Page 1397 of Official Records, in the Office of the 
County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, did grant and 
convey to said Trustee for the uses and purposes set out in said 
Deed of Trust, the property hereinafter described to secure, 
among other obligations, payment of a certain promissory note and 
interest, according to the terms thereof, made and executed by 
the said Pihl and Clark Enterprises, Inc., other sums advanced, £j 
and Interest thereon, and, 
WHEREAS, a breach and default occurred of an obligation for 
which the trust property was conveyed as security under the terms 
of said Deed of Trust In the particulars set forth in tns Notioe 
of Default hereinafter referred to, and 
£ 
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2 
WHEREAS, the then Beneficiary and holder of said note <*ld 
execute and deliver to Trustee written declaration of default and 
demand for sale and 
WHEREAS, Trustee In consequence of said declaration of 
default, election and demand for sale, and In compliance with the 
terms of said Deed of Trust, did on September 26, 1985, file for 
record In the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake, Utah, a 
Notice of Default, Identifying the Trust Deed by stating the name 
of the Trustor named therein and giving tha book and page where 
the sane Is recorded and a description of the trust property and 
containing a statement that a breach c£ an obligation for which 
the trust property was oonveyed as security had occurred, and 
setting forth the nature of such breach and of the election to 
sell of cause to be sold such property to satisfy the obligation, 
and said Trustee on October 4, 1985, did mall by certified mall 
with postage prepaid, a copy of such Notice of Default with the 
recording date shown thereon, addressed to the Trustor and each 
person, a party thereto at the address of such person as set 
forth in the request for a copy of said Notice of Default in the 
Trust Deed and to eaoh person whose name and address are set 
forth in a request therefor, if any, which had been recorded 
prior to the filing for record of the Notice of Default, directed 
to the address designated in said request; and 
WHEREAS, a period of not less than three (3) months did 
elapse after the filing and giving of said Notioe of Default as 
herein set forth, «nd said default not being cured and said Trust 
Deed not being reinstated, and 
-iii-
3 
WHEREAS, Trustee in consequence thereof and in compliance 
with the terms of said Deed of Trust, did execute its No'wica of 
Trusteefs Sale, stating that it, by virtue of the authority in 
it ve-ited, would sell at public auction to the highest bidder for 
cash, in lawful money of the United States, the property 
particularly therein and hereafter described, said property being 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and fixing the time and place 
of said sale as February 19, 1986 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. of said 
day, on the North front steps of the Courts Building, 240 East 
400 South, Sa.lt Lake City, Utah and said Trustee did cause a copy 
of said Notice of Trustee's Sale to be published once a week for 
three consecutive weeks on th* following days, to wit: January 
24, 1986, January 31, 1986, and February 7, 1986, in the SALT 
LAKE TIKES, a newspaper having general circulation, printed and 
published in Salt Lake County, Utah, in which County the property 
to be sold is situated; the last publication thereof being at 
least ten (10) days but not more than thirty (30) days prior to 
the day of sale as fixed in said Notice of Sale; and said Trustee 
did post oopies of said Notice of Sale on Janury 21, 1986 being 
not less than twenty (20) days before the date of sale therein 
fixed, in a oonspiouous place on the property to be sold and also 
in at least three (3) public places in the city or county in 
which the property to be sold is situated; and said Trustee did 
on January 24, 1986, mail by certified mall with postage prepaid, 
a oopy of such Notioe of Trustee's Sale to the Trustor and tc 
eaoh person, a party thereto, at the address of such person as 
set forth in the request for a oopy of said Notioe of Sale in the 
Deed of Trust and to eaoh person whose name and address is set 
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forth in a raquaat therefor, if any, which had baan racordad 
prJo>; to tha filing for raoord of tha Notica of Dafault, rafarrad 
to harain, diraotad to tha addraaa deeignated in aaid raquaat, 
and 
WHEREAS, all applioabla atatutory proviaiona of tha State of 
Utah and all of tha proviaiona of aaid Daad of Truat hava baan 
complied with by tha Truataa aa to acta to ba performed and 
notioaa to ba given, and 
WHEREAS, Truataa did at tha tine and place of aala fixed aa 
aforaaaid, then and there aall, at public auction, to Grantee, 
Home Savinga and Loan, a corporation, being the higheat bidder 
therefor, the property hereinafter deacribed for the aum of One 
Million Thirty Five Thouaand Dollara and Ho Canta ($1,035,000.00) 
paid in oaah, lawful money of the United State of America by 
aatiafaction of part of the indebtedneaa than aeoured by aaid 
Daad of Truat. 
HOW THEREFORE, Home Savinga and Loan, A Utah corporation, aa 
Truataa, in oonaidaration of the preaiaaa reoited and of the aum 
above mentioned, bid and paid by Grantee, tha raoeipt whereof ia 
haraby acknowledged, and by virtue of the authority veated in it 
aa Truatee by aaid Deed of Truat, doea, by these preaenta, grant 
and convey unto Home Savinga and Loan, a corporation, Grantee, 
S 
but without any covenant or warranty, expreaa or implied, all of £ 
•J 
that certain property aituated in Salt Lake County, State of ftg 
Utah, deaorlbad aa followai $ 
PARCEL At Commencing at a point on tha last aida of State « 
straet 139.8 faat Kaat and 764 faat South of tha Morthwaat 91 
corner of tha Southweet quarter of Section 6, Townehip 3 
South, Range 1 Bast, Salt Lake Baaa and Meridian; and 
running thanoe South 146 faat; thanoa last 153.1 feat; 
thanca South 13.58 faat; thanoa Eaat 335.11 faat mora or 
less, to tha Meat Una of tha right of way of tha laat 
Jordan Canal; thanoa Horthaaatarly along tha Heat Una of 
-v-
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said canal right of way to point dua Eaat of tha point of 
oonmanoaaant; thanoa Want 530 faat, mora or lass, to thj 
placa of Comnancsnsnt. 
PARCEL Bi Comaanoing at tha Southvaat Cornar of Lot 9, 
Block 4, Sandy 5 Acra Plat, thanoa 82,5 faat North; thanoa 
153.1 faat East, thanoa South 13.58 faat; thanoa Eaat 335.11 
faat, mora or laas, to a canal; thanoa along said canal to a 
point dua Eaat of tha point of oomaanoaaant; thanoa Wast to 
tha point of oomaanosmant. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said Homa Savings and Loan, a Utah 
corporation,, and in auch capacity aa Trustaa, has causad ita 
corporata nama and saal to ba harato affixad this day of 
Fabruary, 1986. 
HOME SAVINGS AND LOAN, 
Truataa 
By 7/lC?f*Al /,/ffl&*r 
- ' y By. 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
Thomas C, Corlew, 
Assistant Vice President , 
Fred A. SDolka 
President 
tss. 
County of Salt Lake) 
on the 21st day of February, 1986, before »«, the 
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for aaid County and State, 
personally appeared Thomas C. Corlew , and 
Fred A. Smolka who being by as duly sworn, eaoh for 
hineelf and not for the other, did aay that they are the 
Assistant Vice-President and President 
respectively of Hoae Savings and L o a n , a Utah corporation, and 
that the foregoing Trustee's Deed was signed in behalf of said 
corporation, by authority of Its by-laws and that said 
corporation, as Trustee executed the saae 
Rota 
Roaid 
"••'*., 
""•.. 
<*k\ 
My Commission Expirest 
10-12-88 
alt Lake City*, WJWSiWS " l 
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ENERAL 
O N S T . I N C 
June 20, 1934 
Plhl 4 Clark Enterprises 
1347 Miller Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Reference: Self Storage Unit, Sandy, Utah 
Phase 3 
Gentlemen: 
The following is our cost breakdown for the nr n n n c o J 
development and facilities for Phase 3 an3 ? £ ' ! J J ° p e r t l e 8 
submitted. ' and the specifications 
K5\°??.Sq*FtT 51'400 S «- F ' -
Facility cost Facility Cost 
Hydrants- "»J00 H.200 
Sitework " ' J " 19'665 
ssas**-s— 4 S »!:S! 
Sprinkling System 1 , 2 5° 38'550 
Doors 8 y " 6»°00 6,000 
Brick 96,950 88,250 
Paint 11,250 11,250 
Concrete Work' 15,500 15,000 
Curb & Gutter 90'750 8 A » 8 1 0 
Lighting n' 1 0 0 11.1°° 
Insurance U,000 11,500 
Apartment stubbed up 
Sub total 
900 90
2,500 2,500 
583,215 551,725 
less ioz
 ret ?n a Percentage of completion basis every 30 days, 
approved inv i ' Payment t0 be made 10 d^ tys after receipt of 
after a final i ' Flnal Pay«ent of retention to be made 10 days 
inspection and approval is mad«fc by the owner. 
-vii-
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K W
«» W , . S„IH„l.C»v IIU.MM* . ,.-
Pihl & Clark Enterprises -2- June 20, 1984 
It is the intent of this proposal that the owner will be furnished 
with a turnkey project performed as expediously as possible. 
If there are any questions, please contact this office. 
Yours truly, 
WESTERN GENERAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
J. Sterling Wootton 
President 
JSW/km 
UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 
1953 
38-1-5. Priority—Over other encumbrances.—The liens herein provided 
for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, th|e time of the commence-
ment to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or im-
provement, and shall have priority over any lieii, mortgage or other en-
cumbrance which may have attached subsequent 
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first 
material furnished on the ground; also over any 
y to the time when the 
lien, mortgage or other 
incumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and which was un-
recorded at the time the building, structure or 
menced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground. 
improvement was com-
38-1-17. Costs—Apportionment—Costs and attorneys1 fee to subcon-
tractor.—As between the owner and the contractor the court shall appor-
tion the costs according to the right of the case, >^ut in all cases each sub-
contractor exhibiting a lien shall have his costs awarded to him, including 
the costs of preparing and recording the notice of claim of lien and such 
reasonable attorney's fee as may be incurred in (preparing and recording 
said notice of claim of lien. 
38-1-18. Attorneys' fees.—In any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall pe entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the coiirt, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
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T H E 
REVISED STATUTES 
OP THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
IN FORCE 
JAN. 1,1898. 
1400, Attorney's fee. In any action brought to enforce any lien under 
this chapter, where judgment is rendered for a lienholder, such lienholder shall 
be entitled to recover a reasonble attorney's fee, not to exceed twenty-five dollars, 
to be fixed bjT the court, which shall be tiixed as costs in the action. ['9G, pp. 334-3. 
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THE 
COMPILED LAWS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
1907 
**• ei?pterAtlrsu^U?ul p i ty^f f . M * ^ e D f 0 F C e ^ llGfl ^ ' ,01>
»e.v's fee, to be fixed by the cou? t n J * £ „ n t l t e / t o "cover a reasonable at-
"** in the action A ,!d • n «? t 0 e X < ^ d * 2 5 ' w h i c h s 1 ^ ** taxed as m'd '99, p. 81. 
- x -
Art. VI CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 26. [Private laws forbidden.] 
No private or special law shall be enacted where a general law can be 
applicable. 
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•ubjeet Is the same when a case Is submitted 
to the court below, without a Jury, as when a 
Jury Is Impaneled to try the cause. Bank v. 
Earl, 2 Okl. 1517, 39 Pac. 301. Such testimony 
was produced upon tbe examination of El-
dorean Powell beisclf, who testified that she 
•'had not signed the inoitgageM in question; 
that she "had uot authorized any one to sign 
ltM; that she "did not know that a mortgage 
was given on that home for a couple of weeks 
afterwards"; that she was sick in bed, un-
conscious a part of the time, and had been 
sick for three weeks; that she remembeied the 
parties coming in, but did not know what they 
came for; had no conversation with them, 
did not sign the moitgnge and that nothing 
was said to her about signing her name to it; 
that she made no acknowledgment upon It, 
nor had ever consented to the signing of it; 
that It was her home and homestead, and 
the home and homestead of the family, and 
the only one thoy had and that ueithor she 
nor they had e\er abandoned it, but that they 
had left It temporalily, having agieed to rent 
it for one year from about the 1st of March, 
1^07. and had gone to her father and mother, 
where her husband, Oren A. Powell, was, to 
find work This evidence was supported by 
other facts and circumstances The testi-
mony abundantly "tended to support the hnd-
lngsM of the trial coutt aud the finding will 
not be disturbed here. It cannot be disputed 
here that Eldorcau Powell did not join in the 
execution, and did not acknowledge the mort 
page which purported to con\ey the laud for 
the purposes of securing the payment of the 
debt then incurred by Oien Powell, and the 
mortgage was therefore void for all purposes 
from its inception —was so from the begin-
ning,—because there is no quesuon that the 
land was the homestead of the defendants at 
the time the mortgage puiported to ba\e been 
(\oeuted. and because the wife, as the trial 
court found, bad never Joined in its execu 
tion. It is argued, however, tbat when the 
family, after the execution of the mortgage 
bv Oren A Powell left the land, no Intention 
having been proven that Oien Powell intend-
ed to return to It, since he was the head of 
the family, such leaving of the homestead fot 
the period of a year, w ithout the proven in-
tention of returning, was an abandonment. 
If It should be sustained that such u lea\lug 
of the homestead was abandonment, it could 
not avail the plaintiff in error here, since 
there Is no question that at the tune of the 
execution of the mortgage by Oren A. Powell 
the land was the homestead of tne family; 
and since the special findiugs of the court be-
low, supported by evidence, show that the 
wife did not join in the mortgage, it was 
\old from the beginning; and the subsequent 
abandonment, if, indeed, it was Oren Powell** 
intention ne\er to return to the place, could 
have no effect to validate the mortgage or 
entitle the mortgagee to any remedy under it 
against the laud Included therein. Ott • . 
Sprague, 27 Kan 620; Rruner v. Bateman, CO 
Iowa, 4tes, 24 N. W. 9; Shoemaker v. r^ 
lins, 40 Mich. 597, 14 N. W. 550. And, n* 
mortgage bating been *oid fiom the begin 
ning, and no fraud having been shown ^ 
the part of the wife, Powell had a petf*-, 
right to convey the land to his wife, althoujt 
sigued by himself alone. Furrow v. Athej 
21 Neb.]C71, 33 N. W. 20S; Harsh v. Crlflu 
(Iowa) 34 N. W. 441. The latter case d* 
clares that; "A deed by a husband to bl* 
wife of their homestead Is void, unless ltb 
wife joins thctein, thus executing a deed u 
herself of her own interest in the property 
Code, | 11990, Is relied upon to support tbl> 
position. It provides that a deed of a home 
stead Is not valid unless the husband in* 
wife join therein. The case of a deed to tbt 
wife Is not within the spirit of this section 
which surely cannot Intend that the wl/« 
should do the vain and absurd tblug of ei 
ecuting. as grantor, a deed to herself as grau 
teeM The judgment of the couit below wll 
be affirmed. All tbe justices concur. 
ad Utah, ¥>\ 
BRUBAKER v. BENNETT et al. 
(Supreile Court of Utuh. Apnl 20. 1809.) 
MECHANIC'S LIEN — CLJLIM BY SLHCONTIUCTOI-
NOTICK |— ATTORNLY'S FEE — UECOVLHEU m 
LJENUOLDEH — SPECIAL ACT — CONSTITUTJOSU 
LAW. 
1. Under section 1386, Rev. S t , a subeon 
tractor is not requited to state in ins notht 
of lutentiOn to claim a mechanic's lieu any oi 
the terms or conditions of the conn at t betv*ecr 
the OWIHT and the original contractor. 
2. Section 1-100, Rev St , providing for lb* 
recovery by the heubolder, if SIKCCMSIUI, of n 
attorney's fee is a special law, in \iolatioo oi 
buhdiwsiou IS, { 20, aru 0, Cou^t., uud lb en-
tore void.[ 
Miuer, J., dissenting. 
(Syilabujs by the Court.) 
Appeal from district court, Salt Lake county, 
Ogdeu Hues, Judge. 
Action by Q T Brubaker against J II "Ben 
nett and Cinnie Bennett. Judgment for plain 
tiff, and defendants appeal. Plaintiff file* 
cross appeal Attirmed on both appends. 
W. R 
Critchlow 
Hutchinson, for plaintiff. Pierct 
& Barrette, for defeudautb. 
BASKIN, J. This Is a suit to foreclose i 
subcontractor's mechanic's lien. A deniurrtf 
was interposed to the complajnt on the giouad 
that no cause of action was stated. The uV 
muuer was overruled, and on the trial the ad 
mission of the notice of lien was objected U> 
by the defendants on the ground that It W«* 
not In conformity with the provision* of sec-
tion 13SG, Rev. St. Tbe objection being o*tf 
ruled, the defendants excepted. The ground o' 
the demurrer urged by appellants' counsel b 
the same iis the giound of said objection. ^* 
only defect of the notice claimed by the W 
pel lauis is that It fails to state the price, 
terms, or conditions of the contract betwtf* 
the owner and the original contractor. T^ 
section of the statute refeued to Is as folio*'* 
- x i i -
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r llfl^ln.il contractor, within sixty days 
, II.«* »i.iu|»»eiioo of his contract, aud every 
•
 , ,, i.:i\r »*"• ongmal contractor claiming 
1
 " N V . iii ^ , h i s *,»-|l»^*r. must, within forty 
'
, ,
l l"1,', l.r iiirai>liiUK the last material or per-
i n. i.*: i*u' 1-1>l l a l > o r l o r a u y building, iin-
''!!'»lip nt. or siructure, or for any alteration, 
1
 t,il:Vi» t»». i»r , v l i : u r lbL>reor» o r performance 
#r <»i»> I.ii"»r iu or furnishiug any materials for 
ri.i miiiiiiK claim, lite for record with the 
,.!wiii> i«-i*»rder of the county lu which the 
s•• 11> «»r *° ,m* l u r l tt i t ireof is situated, a 
,;!. . . in u riling containing a notice of inten-
, ,, I.I hoi.I and claim a lien, aud a sialemeut 
, f i,.n .!• iii.iiul, after deducting all just credits 
,.«.,! «»IIN»IN Willi the name of the owner, If 
l ii,.u it. IIIM! nl>o the name of tbe person by 
» ?.. in In* was employed, or to whom he fur-
i.!.ii. 1 the material, with a statemeut of the 
1.1in*, iiim* gi\cii, and conditions of his con-
mi. i. j>|M4ii.\iiig the time when the first and 
)t»i i.iimr was performed, or tbe first and 
lni it.auiial.^ furnished, and also a description 
1.1 iin* pmpriiy to he charged with the lieu, 
iiiih.ii m fur identification, which claim must 
(.. \inii<<\ by the oath of himself or of some 
,.il.. i |*i'i.v(»ti.'* Rev. SL § 1380. Any notice 
wiii. h ruiiturms to the provisions of this sec-
ii..II ts suiluitnt, and nothing more than a 
«MIII|.|J:UHT with these provisions can be re-
.juii.tl of a heiiholdcr in order to secure his 
n,:liK to n lien. Hi ere is nothing in said sce-
ii.Hi in Justify the claim of the appellants that 
i»nj llriihiililer, save the original contractor, is 
i.'Pihvd to state in the notice the price, terms, 
«.r r..i». ill ions of the contract between the own* 
n and ihe original contractor. The only thing 
hi il.l.s u'cord which is required of the subcou-
II.MU.I- is a "statement (in the notice) of his 
aMii.ind. after deducting all just credits and 
OHM is, wjth the name of the owner, If known, 
• in! HK* the name of the person by whom he 
W«H employed or to whom he furnished the 
iiMimuls, with a statement of the terms, time 
KiW'ii, and the conditions of his contract," 
Jlir Hihcoutractor does not contract with the 
•»v\m.|, but with the original contractor, and 
it I** the latter contract which is required to be 
••ninl in the notice, with terms, time given, 
«•••Millions, etc., when the subcontractor claims 
• i" ii. The notice iu question does this, and In 
• tl iHiuT respects conforms to the statute. 
"V are therefore of the opinion that the 
»t'»,i»irr<T and objection to the admission of 
*»M notice in evidence were properly over-
rule!. At the trial of the case the plaintiff 
*-i.,.,| the court to allow an attorney's fee ro 
J" ittM-d as costs, in pursuance of section 1400, 
"'
v
 St.. which Is as follows: "In any action 
""""In to enforce auy lien under this chapter, 
*i»*re Judgment is rendered for a llenholder, 
••••'l* llenholder shall be entitled to recover A 
"•"enable- attorney's fee, not to exceed twen-
j live dollars, to be fixed by the court, which 
•hull be taxed as costs in tbe nctiou." It was 
J'luiltieU that $J5 was a reasonable attorney's 
»T, but the defendants objected to its allow-
** on the ground that said section violates 
the provisions of the fourteenth amendment 
to the constitution of the United Slates, which 
prohibits a state from denying any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. The court refused the request of 
plaintiff, and from such refusal the plaintiff 
appeals. 
It Is a fundamental principle of our govern-
ment that all persons are entitled to equal 
rights and equal protection under the law, 
aud that no law shall be enacted which dis-
criminates against oue party for the benefit 
of another. All laws, so far as the nature 
of the case will penult, should be uniform in 
their operation. This principle Is expressed In 
the 6tate constitution In this language: "Iu 
all cases where a general law can be applica-
ble, no special law shall be enacted." Const. 
art. (1. S -b\ subd. 18. In the matter of attor-
ney's fees, or costs in Buits, a general law 
can be made applicable to all parties to the 
litigation; but section 1400 of the Revised 
Statutes is not geueral, but confers the privi-
lege upon a certain class of litigauts of recov-
ering as costs from the opposing party attor-
ney's fees,—a privilege which none but the fa-
vored class of litigants can enjoy under the 
present laws of the state. Such A discrim-
ination in favor of this class of litigants is 
violative of fundamental principles aud the 
provisions of the state constitution. The de-
cree of the court below in sustaining and fore-
closing plaintiff's lien is arhrmed. with costs, 
and the action of tbe court from which plain-
tiff tool; his cross appeal ts also affirmed; aud 
it Is ordered that plaintiff pay the costs of the 
cross appeal. 
BARTCH, C. J., concurs In tbe conclusion. 
MIXER, J. I am of the opiniou that tbe 
demurrer should have been sustained, within, 
the holding of Morrison, Merrill & Co. v. 
Willard (Utah) 53 Pac. 832. I dissent from 
that part of the opinion, but concur in other 
respects. 
(IB Utah, 2U) 
CROFOOT T. THATCHER et at. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. April 3, 1809.) 
CONTRACTS—CONFLICT or LAWS—CORPORATIONS— 
LIABIUTT or STOCKHOLDER*— DEMAND 
NOTES—LIMITATIONS 
1. Lex fori controls in respect to tbe time 
within which a cause of action must be en-
forced, but lex loci contractus controls the 
validity, interpretation, *ud effect of the con-
tract sued upoo. 
2. When a demand note was given under the 
authority of section 3, c. 43, Comp. St. Neb., 
for the unpaid portion of the subscription price 
of stock in an insurance company orgauized un-
der the laws of Nebraska, under section 4 of 
article 11, entitled "Miscellaneous Corpora-
tions," of the constitution of that state, no 
cause of action arot>e ou the note until the in-
solvency of the corporation and until actual 
demand made for the amount of the note. 
3. Under the statute and constitution of Ne-
braska, the p.-ut'u** iiMittt have intended the 
words "ou demand," expressed iu the note, to 
- x i i i -
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230 Md. G50 
Joseph Lewis GLADNEY 
v. 
WARDEN OF the MARYLAND 
PENITENTIARY. 
Post Conviction No. 63. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
TeU IT., 1003. 
Before BRUXE, C. J., and HENDER-
SON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT, HOR-
NEY, MARBURY and SYBERT, JJ. 
PER CURIAM. 
For the reasons given by Judge Manley 
for denying relief below, this application for 
leave to appeal is hereby denied. 
H i Nurmir mitM^ 
ing contractor's mechanics' lien preferenr 
over a subsequently recorded murig.«$;o. 
Order reversed and case remanded w iu: 
directions. 
I. Mortgages O I 5 l ( 3 ) 
Before there can be the "cominu:c 
ment of a building," which would give . 
mechanics' lien claimant a preference u\\r 
a recorded mortgage there must be a nuni-
fes>t commencement of some work or h;' 
on the ground which everyone can re;uh\ 
see and recognize as the commencement of 
a building, and the work done must haw 
been commenced with intention and purpu* 
then formed to continue the work un;:i 
completion of the building and if either of 
the elements is missing then there has been 
no commencement of the building within 
the lien statute. Code 1957, art. 63, § 15. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definition*. 
230 Md. 573 
Christopher A. RUPP et al., Trustees, 
etc., et al. 
v. 
EARL H. CLINE & SONS, INC., et al. 
No. 155. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
Feb. 7, 1903. 
Proceeding for distribution of proceeds 
of a foreclosure sale under a deed of trust. 
The Circuit Court, Frederick County, W. 
Earle Cobey, J., granted mechanics' lien 
claims priority over deed of trust and an 
appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, 
Homey, J., held that removal of soil from 
one part of a development to another for 
dual purpose of grading one site to a 
specified level and filling in the other to 
required grade was at most a preparatory 
operation and was not the "commencement 
of a building," for purposes of giving grad-
2. Mortgages <5=»I5I(3) 
Removal of soil from one part of -
development to another for dual purpose o; 
grading one site to a specified level and fill-
ing in the other to required grade was at 
most a preparatory operation and was not 
the "commencement of a building," for pur-
poses of giving grading contractor's me-
chanics' lien preference over a subsequently 
recorded mortgage. Code 1957, art. 63, § 
15. 
Walter C.IMylander, Jr., and Charles C. 
W. Atwated, Baltimore (Carlyle Barton, 
Jr., Baltimore, and Herbert L. Rollins, 
Frederick, on the brief), for appellants. 
Robert E. Clapp, Jr., and Benjamin B. 
Rosenstock, Frederick (H. Reese Shoe* 
maker, Jr., [Frederick, on the brief), for 
appellees. 
Before r^ENDERSON, HAMMOND, 
PRESCOTTi HORNEY and SYBERT, II. 
-x iv-
EUPP v. EARL H. CLINE & SONS, INO. Md. 147 
Cite m 1S8 A.2d Hd 
HORNEY, Judge. 
This appeal is from an order allowing 
the mechanics' lien claims of the claimants-
appellees (Earl K. Cline and Sons, Inc., et 
al.) priority in the distribution of proceeds 
of a foreclosure sale under a deed of trust 
held by the trustees-appellants (Christopher 
A. Rupp and Sidney H. Tinley, Jr., trustees 
under deed of tru*t from James T. Galloway 
Company, a body corporate). Subsequent 
to the filing of the foreclosure proceedings 
by the trustees, the claimants filed a peti-
tion alleging that work done on the fore-
closed premises had begun prior to the 
recording of the deed of trust and prayed 
that the lien of the trustees be subordinated 
to those of the claimants. 
James T. Galloway and Alfred F. Flynn 
were the sole stockholders in equal shares 
»•: two corporations: The K. & G. Con-
duction Company (K & G) and the 
James T. Galloway Company (Galloway). 
In December of 1953, K & G purchased 
a fifty-acre tract of land in Frederick (from 
1 Roderick Homes, Inc.) to be developed 
r cottages and apartments. Preliminary 
^:l'uiviaion plans for the whole development 
were prepared in March of 1959 and filed 
with the planning commission in April of 
that year. But, although the owners con-
' mlated erecting apartment units for one 
• idrcd and twenty families on a part of 
die tract, they did not furnish detailed plans 
for the apartments at that time and the 
'mission reserved its decision as to the 
. .rtmuits for further consideration. 
Construction of the cottages was begun 
••* 2oun a* the deed for the tract from the 
!|
 r to K & G was recorded in June of 
• »-'. At or about the same time, the then 
c
»vner applied to a mortgage broker for a 
•^•in to construct the apartments, but the 
lormal application for financing the project 
was not submitted by the broker to the lend-
c
' on behalf of Galloway (not K & G) as 
•ruv.tr uniil September 10, 1959. 
during the summer of 1959, when K & G 
needed fill for the area around the cottages 
then under construction, some was moved 
in June and July (by whom it is not clear) 
from an area that was not a part of the 
apartment site. But on September 5, 7, 8 
and 9, K & G directed a contractor (Earl 
H. Cline and Sons, Inc.) to "borrow" ad-
ditional fill from the site on which apart-
ments were subsequently built for the cot-
tage site. Before proceeding, Cline advised 
the owners that soil ought not to be moved 
from one area to another if houses were 
to be built on the former, and was informed 
that since apartments were to be construct-
ed thereon, it would not be necessary to 
replace it. At this time Cline, who was 
operating under a contract with K & G 
relating to the cottage project, was not 
given any grading instructions but was 
told not to cut below the curb line of the 
nearby shopping center. Cline was paid 
for removing the soil as a par: oi the cot-
tage project: the contract r.iuler which 
Cline later worked on the apartment project 
was not submitted until December 31, 1959. 
Pursuant to instructions, Cline, in removing 
some 2000 cubic yards of soil to a depth of 
from four to six feet in some places, leveled 
the apartment site to the approximate grade 
needed. And when the excavation work 
for the slab ground floor of the apartment 
project was begun five month< later, little 
grading was required with ro.-pect to two 
of the apartment buildings, although some 
soil had to be returned tu the apartment site 
from another part of the tract. 
The proposed planning that had been filed 
in April, and was still pending before the 
planning commission, was abandoned in 
mid-September of 195°, and a new plan 
was filed seeking approval o: t'lc contem-
plated 120-unit apartment project on the 
same site. When the project and plan were 
approved by the commission, K & G sought 
rezoning of the 41/2 acre apartment site 
from Residential C to Residential B. This 
was necessary in order to construct 120-
unit apartments. Due notice having been 
given of the application for rezoning, the 
Mayor and Aldermen of Frederick held a 
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public hearing as advertised, but reserved 
their decision on the matter. 
When rezoning had not been granted 
after the expiration of more than forty 
days—and the lender in the meantime had 
given its commitment for the financing of 
a 4S-unit apartment project—the request 
for rc::oning was withdrawn, the with-
drawal was approved by the city, and, in 
November of 1959, Galloway, as owner, and 
K & G, as builder, applied for permission 
to proceed with building a 48-unit apart-
ment project which did not require rczon-
ing. The permit was finally issued on 
December 21, 1959, and about two weeks 
later a utility contract with the city was 
also approved, but a formal contract was 
never executed. 
A deed from K & G conveying the apart-
ment site to Galloway was executed on 
December 29, 1959, and was recorded on 
the 31st. On the same day Cline submitted 
its proposal (never formally accepted by 
either K & G or Galloway) for grading and 
excavating work at the apartment site,1 
but it was not until after traverse lines had 
been run and two apartment buildings were 
staked out early in February of 1960 that 
Cline began excavating for the foundations. 
The construction loan was finally approv-
ed on January 12, 1960, the deed of trust 
and note were executed on January 25, and 
the deed of trust was recorded on January 
27. In the afternoon of the same day an 
agent of the title insurance company and a 
salesman for K & G went to the premises 
and took photographs, which clearly show-
ed that soil had been removed from the site 
sometime before, but did not show any 
stakes, trenches, excavations for founda-
tions or other evidence of the commence-
ment of a building. 
The discovery on August 15, 1960, of 
the absence of utilities for the project, 
brought about foreclosure of the deed of 
trust and a sale of the apartment premises. 
I. Specifically, Cline proposed to "strip 
ami stockpile topsoil"; to "excavate and 
rough grade site"; to "excavate founda* 
The chancellor, being of the opinion that 
limiting the iommencunent of a build in •; 
to the di; ' of the foundation w;>s 
ignore modern building practices, found a 
continuing intention on the part of K & G 
and Galloway! to erect apartments as soon 
as they acquired the necessary financing 
and authority to proceed and that the ex-
cavaiinn work done in February of ln< > 
was a continuation of the grading work 
done in September of 1959, and decided 
that the claimants were entitled to priority 
over the trustees in the distribution of the 
net proceeds prom the foreclosure sale. 
While numerous primary and secondary 
questions are presented by the appeal, it 
is not necessary to consider all of them. 
The principal I question is what cou.stituus 
the commencement of a building within the 
meaning of the mechanics' lien law. 
It is clear that if any lienable work was 
done for or about the apartment site before 
the recording of the deed of trust which 
could be said to be the "commencement of 
[the] building,!1 then the liens of the claim-
ants would ,4b^ preferred." Code (1957), 
Art. 63, § 15. But, as we see it, that wa> 
not the case here. 
At the outset we point out that § 1 of Art. 
63, which defines to what and for what a 
mechanics' lien attaches, has been amended 
from time to time, to include many things, 
besides work done on and materials fur-
nished for a building, such as services for 
"grading, filling and landscaping." But 
the provisions of § 15 (of Art. 63), relating 
to preference over other liens, which were 
enacted by Ch 205 of the Laws of 183S, 
have never been changed, except for an 
amendment as to form made by Ch. 287 of 
the Laws of 18-15. 
The effect anjd meaning of the provisions 
of § 15 of Art. p3 were considered and con-
strued by this Court in three early cases. 
In the first of these, Brooks v. Lester, 36 
tions (no footers)"; and to "replace top-
soil and fine grade as per plans.'9 
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Md. 65 (1872), where the question was 
^whether the driving of pegs into the ground 
in laying out a house was sufficient to con-
stitute the beginning of construction, it was 
said, among other things, that the com-
mencement of a building is the first work 
done on the ground which is made the foun-
dation of the building and forms a part of 
the work suitable and necessary for its 
construction. 
In the second case, Jean v. Wilson, 38 
Md. 2S8 (1S73), where the question was 
whether the construction of foundation 
walls at the time building lots were being 
filled and graded (with the intention of 
•erecting houses thereon in the future) in or-
der to avoid the expense of subsequent ex-
cavation for cellars constituted the com-
mencement of a building, it was held that 
the mortgagees were entitled to priority. 
Finally, in Kelly v. kosenstock, 45 Md. 
389 (1S76), where the driving of stakes 
and the digging away of soil to level the 
ground prior to beginning construction 
were held not to be th" commencement of 
the building, the princi;' ;s of law laid down 
in the two preceding '.uses were restated 
thus (at p. 392): 
'\Ve have said in Brooks v. Lester, 
* * * that what '^ e law means by 
the \'c...#,v.!w..*!i / .' the building* is 
Some work or lab.- on the ground, 
such as beginning t . dig the founda-
tion, or work of like Inscription, which 
every one can rcadi\ ee and recognize 
as the comiueuccn...*: of a building/ 
and in Jean v. WxL.n, • * * we 
held that such wor!: *-_:st be done with 
the intention and p*. "}se then formed 
to continue it to th. ,mpletion of the 
building, and that th*. \ork done on the 
ground without any .^ign or purpose 
of constructing a bu.»:ing at that time, 
and which was inter-":ted, is not suffi-
cient." 
U] The-e cas-cs r • it clear that be-
fore there can be the : .nmencement of a 
building which would p ^ a mechanics' lien 
claimant a preference over a recorded mort-
gage there must be (i) a manifest com-
mencement of some work or labor on the 
ground which every one can readily see 
and recognize as the commencement of a 
building and (ii) the work done must have 
been begun with the intention and purpose 
then formed to continue the work until the 
completion of the building. If either of 
these elements is missing then there has 
been no "commencement of the building" 
within the meaning of § 15 of Art. 63. 
The cases in other jurisdictions are gen-
erally in accord. See, for example, Fryman 
v. McGhee, 108 Ohio App. 501, 163 N.E.2d 
63 (1958); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Birzer Bldg. Co., 101 N.E2d 408 (Ohio 
Com.P1.1950); Ustruck v. Home Associa-
tion, 166 Minn. 183, 207 N.VV. 324 (1926); 
North Shaker Blvd. Co. v. Harriman Nat. 
Bank, 22 Ohio App. 487, 153 N.E. 909 
(1924); Kiene v. Hodge, 90 Iowa 212, 57 
N.W. 717 (1894); Pennock v. Hoover, 5 
Rawle 291 (Pa.1835). See particularly 
National Lumber Co. v. Farmer & Son, 
Inc., 251 Minn. 100, 87 N.W.2d 32 (1957), 
where the Court, in finding that the erection 
of a fence around a tree on the premises 
(that had been paid for prior to the execu-
tion of the construction mortgage) was not 
the actual and visible beginning of the 
building but was several and separate from 
the work done on the house, had this to say 
(at p. 36 of 87 N.W.2d) with regard to the 
transactions: 
"[T]he line of distinction is whether 
or not the improvement bears direct-
ly on the construction of the building 
rather than whether it is a part of the 
overall project involved. * * * And 
where excavation is involved, it ap-
pears that the excavation itself or 
something directly connected therewith, 
rather than any prior activity, consti-
tutes the beginning of the visible im-
provement." 
[2] It may be that the abandonment of 
the 120-unit apartment project, and the 
undertaking to build the 48-unit apartment 
- x v i i -
150 M d- 1 S 8 ATLANTIC EErOETER, 2d SBRIES 
project instead, was such a change of plan 
as would, in any event, prevent the 
mechanics' licr.s from relating back to the 
time when the apartment site was graded 
or leveled in the early part of September 
of 1959, but even if it is assumed (for the 
purposes of this case) that there was no 
substantial change of plan and that the 
owner and builder had a continuing inten-
tion—if and v.!u*i ihey c:w\d tret financing 
and permission—to erect apartments of 
some type, we think it is apparent that the 
removal of soil from one part of the de-
velopment to another even for the dual pur-
pose of grading one site to a specified level 
and filling in the other to the required 
height was at most a preparatory operation 
that was not the "commencement of the 
tinkling." While the removal of MJU hud 
the effect of leveling the apartment site, 
that fact did not constitute commencement 
for the purpose of fixing the time to which 
a lien could relate. Kelly v. Rosenstock, 
eupra. Nor did the grading or leveling— 
since there was no work on the ground 
which everyone could readily see and recog-
nize as the commencement of a building, 
Brooks v. Lester, supra—have the effect of 
putting the party making the construction 
loan on notice that the building had been 
commenced, and we so hold. 
To hold otherwise would be contrary to 
the previous decisions of this Court. If any 
change in. the meaning and effect of § 15 
(of Art. 63) is either desirable or required 
that is a matter for the legislature, not the 
courts, to consider. 
With this holding we do not reach the re-
maining questions presented by the trustees-
appellants concerning the requirement of 
notice to an owner of intention to claim a 
lien and the entitlement of a claimant to a 
lien for grading a public thoroughfare into 
and through the apartment site. Nor is it 
necessary—since it appears that taxes for 
the then current year had been paid in ad-
vance—for us to consider the contention of 
the claimants-appellees that the lender made 
further advances to the borrower after it 
had defaulted. Similar contentions were 
made and decided in Rupp et a!., Trustees 
v. M. S. Johnsion Co., 226 Md. 181, 172 A.2d 
875 (1961). 
Order reversed and case remanded for 
the entry of an order in conformity with 
this opinion; the appellees to pay the 
costs. 
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James Omar TULL 
v. 
ST^TE of Maryland, 
No. 185. 
Court ofl Appeals of Maryland, 
Feb. 12, 19C3. 
The defendant was convicted in the 
Circuit Court for Dorchester County, W. 
Laird Henry, CL J., and E. McMaster Duer, 
A. J., of first-degree murder, and he ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Marbury, 
J., held that defendant was not entitled 
to separate trial on issue of insanity, and 
that error, if any, in refusing challenge 
to array after selected and prospective ju-
rors heard a prospective juror state that 
he thought defendant was guilty was rem-
edied by indications of selected juror and 
prospective jurors that that statement would 
not affect their opinion. 
Affirmed. 
I. CrlmlA&t U w ^ » U 6 6 P ) 
Error, if aijy, in refusing challenge to 
array after selected and prospective jurors 
heard a prospective juror state that he 
thought defendant was guilty was remedied 
by indications of selected juror and pro-
spective jurors that that statement would 
not affect their opinion. 
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and his advantaged position, that in such 
matters he is allowed a comparatively wide 
latitude of discretion which will not he 
disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse, 
a circumstance which we have not found 
here. Anderson v. Anderson, IS Utah 2d 
286, 422 P.2d 192 (1967); Frank v. Frank, 
IS Utah 2d 228, 419 F.2d 199 (1966); 
Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 F.2d 
977 (1956). This is also true of attorney 
fees which it is likewise the trial court's 
prerogative to fix. Chri-tenscn v. Chris-
tensen, IS Utah 2d 315, 422 P.2d 534. 
Affirmed. Costs to defendant (respond-
ent) . 
424 I\2d 437 
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORA-
TION, a corporation, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION COMPA-
NY, a corporation et al., Defendants, 
Oscar E. Chytraus Company, Inc., a corpora-
tion, Gibbons & Reed Concrete Products 
Company, a corporation, Richard P. Gar-
rick, Boise Cascade Corporation, a corpora-
tion, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 10516. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 27, 19C7. 
Action involving priorities of construc-
tion mortgage and mcchanics , liens. The 
P. v. COTTONWOOD CONST. CO. 4 0 9 
:tah2d409 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Aldon J. Anderson, J., made findings as to 
relative priorities of mechanics' lienors and 
mortagee, and the lienors took an inter-
locutory appeal. The Supreme Court, Tuck-
ett, J., held that construction money mort-
gage providing that mortgage will also 
secure additional loans made by the then 
holder of the note secured to the then owner 
of the real estate described, provided that 
no such additional loan would be made if 
the making thereof would cause the total 
indebtedness secured to exceed the amount 
of the original indebtedness, created obli-
gation on part of lender to pay over funds 
in accordance with borrower's directions 
and mortgagee had priority for monies ac-
tually advanced under mortgages over liens 
for materials furnished subsequent to re-
cording of mortgages. 
Affirmed. 
Henriod, J., dissented in part. 
I. Mortgages C= 151(3) 
Construction money mortgage provid-
ing that mortgage would secure additional 
loans made by the then holder of the note 
secured to the then owner of the real estate 
described but providing that no such addi-
tional loan would be made if the making 
thereof would cause the total indebtedness 
secured to exceed the amount of the orig-
inal indebtedness, created obligation on part 
of lender to pay over funds in accordance 
with borrower's directions, and mortgagee 
- x i x -
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thus had priority for monies actually ad-
vanced under mortgage over liens for ma-
terials furnished subsequent to recording 
of mortgage. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5. 
2. Mechanics' Liens C=>I73 
Statute providing for mechanics' lien 
upon "commencement to do work or fur-
nish materials on the ground" is limited to 
the home or other structure which is being 
or about to be built upon the land, and liens 
for labor or materials furnished in off-site 
improvements in connection with laying out 
and construction of facilities used in con-
nection with subdivision as a whole would 
not relate back and take effect as of time 
first work was done in respect to laying out 
the subdivision and the installation of water 
lines, sewers, curbs and gutters and street 
paving. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5. 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Mechanics' Liens C=>183 
Presence of materials on building site 
or evidence on the ground that work has 
commenced on structure or preparatory 
thereto is notice to all the world that liens 
may have attached, however, off-site con-
struction in developing subdivision for build-
ing sites would not necessarily bring to at-
tention of lendor that someone might be 
claiming lien to particular lot, especially 
where lendor advances construction money 
to build home long after subdivision has 
been developed. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5. 
VanCottL Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 
Fabian & Clendenin, Cannon, Duffin & 
Tacc, Murk & Schoenhals, Neslen & Mock, 
Salt Lake City, for appellants. 
Halliday & Halliday, Backman, Back-
man & C 
Salt Lake 
ark, Ray Quinney & Ncbeker, 
ICity, for respondent. 
TUCKEfTT, Justice. 
This case is now before the court on an 
interlocutory appeal. It involves the rela-
tive priorities of mechanics lienors' and a 
construction mortgage which the plaintiff 
and respondent seeks to foreclose on lot 10, 
Lazy Bar Subdivision of Salt Lake County. 
The district court made certain rulings 
of which the following two arc the subject 
of this appeal: 
1. That the documents evidencing the 
mortgage transaction between the plaintiff-
respondent Western Mortgage Loan Cor-
poration and the defendant, Cottonwood 
Construction Company, provided for oblig-
atory or nonvolitional advances, and that 
such advanlces together with attorneys fees 
and costs take priority as of the time of the 
recording <pf the mortgage. 
2. A denial of the mechanics lienors' 
motion for a partial summary judgment to 
the effect that certain work constituted the 
"commencebient to do work or furnish ma-
terials on tjhe ground for the structure or 
improvement" within the meaning of Sec-
tion 38-1-5. U.C.A.1953. 
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The work of laying out and developing 
the subdivision, including engineering, in-
stalling water mains, sewer mains and later-
als, curb and gutter, surfacing streets and 
other off-site construction was accom-
plished by Cottonwood Construction Com-
pany (the mortgagor) and its predecessors. 
The lateral sewer line installed on Lot 10 
terminated inside the lot. The sewer and 
lateral were completed about January 1, 
1961. Water mains were completed about 
August, 1962, streets, curb and gutter were 
commenced in 1961 and completed in 1962. 
The Mountain States Telephone and Tele-
graph Company erected utility poles in the 
subdivision, including one on Lot 10. 
Application for a construction loan was 
made to Western Mortgage Loan Corpora-
* tion and approved. A note and mortgage in 
the amount of $15,750.00 were executed 
October 29, 1962, and the mortgage was re-
corded that day. 
A separate loan agreement was entered 
into between Western and Cottonwood Con-
struction Company, which provided in part 
that in event of default on the part of the 
mortgagor, Western was released from all 
further obligations to the borrower, or in 
the alternative, it could take possession of 
the premises, finish the improvements and 
charge the costs to the borrower to be 
secured on the note and mortgage. 
I- LFtah Savings & Loan Association 
;P. v. COTTONWOOD CONST. CO. A\ 1 
Utah 2d 401) 
When it later became apparent that 
Cottonwood had misapplied funds advanced 
by Western, the latter elected to complete 
the home. At the time Western took over 
the construction it had advanced approxi-
mately $9,500. An additional sum of about 
$5,000 was used to complete the home on 
Lot 10. 
[1] A provision of the note and mort-
gage is as follows: "This mortgage shall 
also secure additional loans hereafter made 
by the then holder of the note secured here-
by to the then owner of the real estate 
described herein, provided that no such ad-
ditional loan shall be made if the making 
thereof would cause the total indebtedness 
secured hereby to exceed the amount of the 
original indebtedness stated herein." 
It is the appellants' contention that the 
language of the note and mortgage 
quoted above provided for nonvolitional or 
nonobligatory advances and that each ad-
vance made thereunder takes priority only 
as of its date. 
Under the construction loan agreement 
Western was obligated to pay out the funds 
as the building progressed. We are of the 
opinion that the agreement to disburse the 
funds created an obligation on the part of 
lender to pay over the funds in accord-
ance with the borrower's directions.1 W c 
see no distinction between the mortgage in 
Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Me-
v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 36G P.2d 59S. 
- x x i -
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cham 2 and the mortgage before us in this 
case. Under the terms of the loan agree-
ment Western was obligated to deposit the 
net proceeds of the loan in a separate ac-
count to be expended in accordance with the 
agreement. The mortgage provides for ad-
ditional loans to be secured by the mortgage, 
nevertheless, the instrument is for a single 
fixed amount, and no additional loans were 
in fact made. 
The appellants' second assignment of 
error relates to the court's denial of the mo-
tion for summary judgment based upon a 
finding that the facts set forth in the sup-
porting affidavits did not constitute "com-
mencement to do work or furnish materials 
on the ground for the structure or improve-
ment" within the meaning of Section 3 8 - 1 -
5 U.C.A.1953. The appellants claim they 
are entitled to have their liens relate back 
and take effect as of the time the first 
work was done in respect to laying out the 
subdivision and the installation of water 
lines, sewers, curb and gutters and street 
paving. 
[2,3] We are not inclined to give the 
statute such a broad meaning as contended 
for by the appellants. We are inclined to 
the view that the legislature intended the 
language "commencement to do work or 
2. Ibid; Valley Lumber Co. v. Wright, 2 
Cnl.App. 2SS, R4 P. 5S; Homo Saving* 
& Loan Association v. Burton, 20 Wash. 
furnish materials on the ground" to be lim-
ited to relate to the home or other structure 
which was being or about to be built upon 
the land. To tack the liens for labor or ma-
terials thai: went into the construction of the 
house to the liens that may have arisen for 
labor and materials furnished in off-site im-
provements in connection with the laying 
out and construction of facilities used in 
connection with the subdivision as a whole 
would be going beyond the intent of the 
statute. The problem is one of notice. The 
presence of materials on the building site 
or evidence on the ground that work has 
commenced on a structure or preparatory 
thereto is notice to all the world that liens 
may have I attached. However, the off-
site construction in developing the sub-
division for building sites would not neces-
sarily bring to the attention of a lender 
that someone is claiming a lien on a particu-
lar lot in the subdivision. This is especially 
true as in this case, where the lender ad-
vanced money to build a home long after the 
subdivision 
for unpaid 
erection of 
had been laid out and developed. 
It is apparent that the persons who supplied 
labor or materials for the construction of 
roads, sewers, etc., could have filed liens 
balances due them, if any. The 
the home was separate and scv-
OSS, 50 PL 040; soc also anno. 70 A L.R. 
1402: SO A.LK2.1 191: 57 C..T.S. Me-
chanies Lilens § 205, p. 774. 
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crable from the earlier work in developing 
the subdivision,3 
The orders and rulings of the district 
court are affirmed. Costs to respondent. 
CALLISTER and ELLET, JJ., concur. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (concurring 
specially) : 
I agree that under the facts as disclosed 
in this case a mortgage for a definite 
amount, which is recorded prior to the at-
tachment of any lien rights, should under 
normal circumstances take preference up to 
the amount that is paid out under the terms 
of the recorded mortgage agreement. But 
I desire to note that there may be situations 
in which the lending institution is holding 
money not yet advanced on a building, when 
it acquires actual knowledge that the builder 
is diverting money to some other purpose, 
and knows that the laborers or materialmen 
are not being paid and will not be paid. 
Under such circumstances the financier cer-
tainly should not be permitted to go on pay-
ing the money to a builder and thus in effect 
assist in cheating the laborers and material-
men out of their pay and preclude them 
from the right to lien protection. See dis-
senting opinion of Jones, District Judge, in 
Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Me-
cham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598. 
3. National Lumber Co, v. Farmer & Son, 
Inc. et al., 231 Minn. 100, S7 N.W.2d 32; 
Eupp v. Earl II. Cline & Sons, Inc. ct 
. v. COTTONWOOD CONST. CO. 4 1 3 
tali 2d 400 
HENRIOD, Justice (concurring and dis-
senting) : 
I concur in that portion of the main opin-
ion with respect to commencement of work, 
etc., but dissent from that portion having to 
do with priority of liens of materialmen. 
The main opinion says, "We sec no dis-
tinction between the mortgage in Utah Sav-
ings & Loan Association v. Mechan." This 
statement is disarming. True, there is no 
difference in the recorded mortgage, upon 
which Utah Savings relied, and the one 
here. The fallacy of the main opinion's 
conclusion lies in its assumption that the 
cause of action in the Utah Savings case 
was identical to this present Western Mort-
gage case. The former was based on the 
recorded mortgage, while in this case it was 
based on an unrecorded collateral agree-
ment snuggled to the bosoms of the mort-
gagor and mortgagee, without any oppor-
tunity for the materialmen to take a look-
see. 
The cases are not the same. In Utah 
Savings, materialmen could rely on the rec-
ord. In our present case the main opinion 
charges materialmen with notice of an un-
recorded, independent agreement. The 
recorded mortgage in Utah Savings said ad-
vancement of moneys by the mortgagee was 
obligatory. The unrecorded collateral 
agreement in the present case clearly was 
nl.f 230 Md. 573, 188 A.2d 140, 1 A.L.R. 
3d 815. 
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not obligatory, but volitional. A material-
man may not deliver a two-by-four piece of 
plywood if he knew he could not rely on the 
recorded promise of the mortgagee to pay 
the mortgagor as represented, but would be 
bound by a secret, unrecorded agreement 
that would permit the mortgagee to cancel 
the recorded promise five minutes after it 
was supported by substantial evidence and 
that Commission's denial of award of bene-
fits was not arbitrary or capricious. 
Afflirmed. 
I. Workmen's Compensation C=>I358, I362 
Workmen's compensation claimant 
must show, as predicate to his recovery, 
was recorded, an incident beyond the ken of t h a t h c suffered claimed accident arising 
aterialman. To conclude otherwise does o l l t o f °|r i n c o u r s e o f h i s employment and a m:i 
not dignify the recording act. 
O | « t NUMBER SYSUM^ 
421 P.2d 440 
William C. JENSEN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNITED STATES FUEL COMPANY and the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Defendants. 
No. 10600. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 1, 19G7. 
Original proceeding seeking reversal of 
order of Industrial Commission denying ap-
plication for workmen's compensation bene-
fits. The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., 
held that determination of Commission that 
act of claimant in bumping his back while 
working in defendant's mine was not signifi-
that it proximately caused his injury. 
2. Workmen's Compensation O I 9 3 5 
On Review of order of Industrial Com-
mission denying application for workmen's 
compensation benefits, Supreme Court 
would assume that Commission believed evi-
dence and reasonable inferences therefrom 
favorable to employer's position. 
3. Workmen's Compensation C=>I305 
It isl not prerogative of panel appointed 
to conduct medical examination of work-
men's compensation claimant to encroach 
upon authority vested in Industrial Commis-
sion to friake findings of fact and render 
decision on application, but rather, its prop-
er purpo|se is limited to medical examina-
tion and diagnosis, evidence of which is to 
be considered by Commission in arriving at 
its decision. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-77, 35-1-85. 
4. Workmen's Compensation C=>I492 
Determination of Industrial Commis-
sion that) act of claimant in bumping his 
back aft^r crawling under machine while 
cant factor in causing his back condition working as mechanic in defendant's mine 
- x x i v -
